Various studies have empirically shown that the majority of Java and Android apps misuse cryptographic libraries, causing devastating breaches of data security. erefore, it is crucial to detect such misuses early in the development process. e fact that insecure usages are not the exception but the norm precludes approaches based on property inference and anomaly detection.
INTRODUCTION
Digital devices are increasingly storing sensitive data, which is o en protected using cryptography. However, it is insufficient to use secure cryptographic algorithms. A developer must also know how to securely use such algorithms in their code. Unfortunately, prior studies suggest that this is rarely the case. Lazar Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). ICSE'18, Gothenburg, Sweden © 2017 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). 978-x-xxxx-xxxx-x/YY/MM. . . $15.00 DOI: 10.1145/nnnnnnn.nnnnnnn et al. [17] examined 269 published cryptography-related vulnerabilities. ey found that 223 are caused by developers misusing a security library, and only 46 result from faulty library implementations. Egele et al. [12] statically analyzed 11,748 Android apps using cryptography-related application interfaces (Crypto APIs) and found 88% of them violated at least one basic cryptography rule. Chatzikonstantinou et al. [11] reached a similar conclusion by first analyzing apps dynamically and then performing a manual inspection for misuses.
Such pervasive insecure use of cryptographic libraries is problematic for several reasons. First, the misuses of Crypto APIs lead to devastating data breaches in a large number of applications. Rasthofer et al. [25] show that virtually all smartphone apps that rely on cloud services use hard-coded keys. A simple decompilation gives adversaries access to those keys, and to all data that all these apps store in the cloud. Nadi et al. [22] were the first to investigate why developers o en struggle to use Crypto APIs. e authors conducted four studies, two of which survey Java developers familiar with the Java Crypto APIs. e majority of participants (65%) found their respective Crypto APIs hard to use. When asked why, participants mentioned the API level of abstraction, insufficient documentation without examples, and API design make it difficult to understand how to properly use Crypto APIs. A potential long-term solution is redesigning the APIs to provide an easyto-use interface for developers that is secure by default. However, it remains crucial to detect and fix the existing insecure API uses.
When asked about what would simplify their API usage, participants wished they had tools that help them automatically detect misuses and suggest possible fixes Nadi et al. [22] . Unfortunately, approaches based solely on specification inference and anomaly detection [26] are not viable for Crypto APIs, because-as elaborated above-most uses of Crypto APIs are insecure.
In this paper, we present (a) C SL, a definition language that enables cryptography experts to specify the secure usage of their Crypto APIs, and (b) C C , a compiler that parses and type-checks C SL rules and translates them into a static analysis.
e analysis automatically checks a given Java or Android app for compliance with the encoded C SL rules. C SL goes beyond methods that are useful for general validation of API usage (e.g., typestate analysis [2, 7, 8, 23] and data-flow checks [1, 5] ) by enabling the expression of domain-specific constraints related to cryptographic algorithms and their parameters. Our focus is the Java Cryptography Architecture (JCA), because it is the primary cryptography API for Java applications [22] . To evaluate C SL, we encoded a comprehensive ruleset for the JCA classes and interfaces, and we used the generated static analysis to scan 10,001 1 S e c r e t K e y G e n e r at or kG = KeyGenerator . getInstance ( AES ) ; Android apps that use the JCA. C C found at least one misuse in 96% of the apps. For more than 75% of the apps, C C finishes in under 4 minutes. In summary, this paper presents the following contributions:
• We introduce C SL, a definition language to specify correct usages of Crypto APIs.
• We encode a comprehensive specification of correct usages of the JCA in C SL.
• We present C C , a compiler that translates C SL rules into a static analysis to find violations in a given Java or Android app.
• We empirically evaluate C C on 10,001 Android apps.
We will open source our implementation and artifacts on GitHub. Figure 3 : A C SL rule in Extended Backus-Naur Form (EBNF) [6] .
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
roughout the paper, we will use the code example in Figure 1 to motivate the language features in C SL. Lines 1-3 generate a 128-bit secret key to use with the encryption algorithm AES. Lines 5-7 use that key to initialize a Java Cipher object that encrypts plaintextMSG. Since AES encrypts plaintext block by block, it must be configured to use one of several modes of operation. e mode of operation determines how to encrypt a block based on the encryption of the preceding block(s). Line 6 configures Cipher to use the Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) of operation [20] .
Although the code example may look straightforward, there are a number of subtle mistakes that render the encryption insecure. First, both KeyGenerator and Cipher only support a limited choice of encryption algorithms. If the developer passes an unsupported algorithm to either getInstance methods, the respective line will throw a runtime exception. Similarly, the design of the APIs separates the classes for key generation and encryption.
erefore, the developer needs to make sure they pass the same algorithm to the getInstance methods of KeyGenerator and Cipher. If the developer does not configure the algorithms as such, the generated key will not fit the encryption algorithm, and the encryption will fail by throwing a runtime exception. Moreover, some supported algorithms are no longer considered secure (e.g., DES or AES/ECB [14] ). If the developer selects such an algorithm, the program will still run to completion, but the resulting encryption will be insecure.
To use Crypto APIs properly, developers have to take two dimensions of correctness into consideration: (1) the functional correctness that allows the program to run and terminate successfully and (2) the provided security guarantees. Prior empirical studies have shown that developers frequently succeed in obtaining functional correctness by, for instance, looking for code examples on web portals such as StackOverflow [13] . However, they o en fail to obtain a secure use of Crypto APIs, primarily because most code examples on those web portals provide insecure solutions [13] .
CRYSL SYNTAX
Instead of relying on the security of existing usages and examples, we present an approach in which cryptography experts define correct API usages in a domain-specific language, C SL. In this section, we give an overview of the C SL syntax elements. A formal treatment of the C SL semantics is presented in Section 4. Figure 2 presents the basic syntactic elements of C SL, and Figure 3 presents the full syntax for a C SL rule. Figure 4 shows an abbreviated C SL rule that defines the correct usage of javax.crypto.KeyGenerator in the example in Figure 1 .
Mandatory Sections in a C SL Rule
To provide simple and reusable constructs, a C SL rule is defined on the level of individual classes. erefore, the rule starts off by stating the class that it is defined for.
In Figure 4 , the OBJECTS section defines four objects to be used in later sections of the rule (e.g., the object algorithm of type String). ese objects are typically used as parameters or return values in the EVENTS section.
e EVENTS section defines all methods that may contribute to the successful usage of a KeyGenerator object, including three getInstance methods that are defined by two method event patterns (Lines 17-18).
e first parameter of all three methods is a String object whose value states the algorithm that the key should be generated for. is parameter is represented by the previously defined algorithm object. Two of the getInstance methods are overloaded with two parameters. Since we do not need to specify the second parameter in either method, we substitute it with an underscore that serves as a placeholder in one combined pattern definition (Line 18). Finally, the rule defines pa erns for the various init methods that set the proper parameter values (e.g., keysize) and a generateKey method that completes the key generation and returns the generated key.
Line 30 defines a usage pa ern for KeyGenerator using the keyword ORDER. e usage pa ern is a regular expression of method event pa erns that are defined in EVENTS. Although Init := i1 | i2 | i3 | i4 ; 26 27 GenKey : key = generateKey () ; pa ern defines a label to simplify referencing related events (e.g., g1, i2, and GenKey), it is tedious and error-prone to require listing all those labels again in the ORDER section. erefore, C SL allows defining aggregates. An aggregate represents a disjunction of multiple pa erns by means of their labels. Line 19 defines an aggregate that groups the two getInstance pa erns. Using aggregates, the usage pa ern for KeyGenerator reads: there must be exactly one call to one of the getInstance methods, followed by an optional call to one of the init methods, and finally a call to generateKey. Following the keyword CONSTRAINTS, Lines 33-35 define the constraints for objects defined under OBJECTS and used as parameters or return values in the EVENTS section. In the abbreviated C SL rule in Figure 4 , the first constraint limits the value of algorithm to AES or Blowfish. For each algorithm, there is one constraint that restricts the possible values of keysize.
e ENSURES section is the final mandatory construct in a C SL rule.
e section specifies predicates to govern interactions between different classes. For example, a Cipher object uses a key obtained from a KeyGenerator. e ENSURES section specifies what a class provides, presuming that the object is used properly. For example, the KeyGenerator C SL rule in Figure 4 ends with the definition of a predicate generatedKey with the generated key object and its corresponding algorithm as parameters. is predicate may be required by the rule for Cipher or other classes that make use of such a key through the optional element of the REQUIRES block as illustrated in Figure 5 . We have enriched C SL with several auxiliary functions. For example, in Figure 5 , the function alg extracts the encryption algorithm from transformation (Line 55). is function is necessary, because generatedKey expects only the encryption algorithm as its second parameter, but transformation holds more values than just the algorithm (e.g., Line 6 in Figure 1 ).
Optional Sections in a C SL Rule
A C SL rule may contain optional sections that which we will showcase through the C SL rule for PBEKeySpec. In Figure 6 , the FORBIDDEN section specifies methods that should not be called, because calling them is always insecure. PBEKeySpec derives cryptographic keys from a user-given password. For security reasons, it is recommended to use a cryptographic salt for this operation. However, the constructor PBEKeySpec(char[] password) does not allow for a salt to be passed and the implementation in the default provider does not generate one.
erefore, this constructor should not be called, and any call to it should be flagged. Consequently, the C SL rule for PBEKeySpec lists it in the FORBIDDEN section (Line 72). In the case of PBEKeySpec, there is an alternative secure constructor (Line 68). C SL allows specifying an alternative method pa ern event using the arrow notation (Line 72).
In general, predicates are generated for a particular usage only if it follows the usage pa ern defined in the ORDER section and fulfils all constraints in the CONSTRAINTS section of its corresponding rule. However, PBEKeySpec differs from that pa ern. e class contains a constructor that receives a user-given password, but the method clearPassword deletes that password later. Consequently, a PBEKeySpec object fulfils its role a er calling the constructor until clearPassword is called. To support this usage, C SL allows specifying a method event pa ern that if called, a predicate is generated using the keyword after (Line 80). C SL further supports killing an existing predicate in the NEGATES section (Line 83). 
CRYSL FORMAL SEMANTICS 4.1 Basic Definitions
A C SL rule consists of several sections.
e OBJECTS section comprises a set of typed variable declarations V. In the syntax in Figure 3 , each declaration ∈ V is represented by the syntax element TYPE varname.
e EVENTS section contains elements of the form (m, ), where m ∈ M and ∈ V * . M is the set of all resolved method signatures, where each signature includes the method name and argument types. e FORBIDDEN section lists a set of methods M denoted by their signatures; forbidden events cannot bind any variables. e ORDER section specifies the usage pa ern in terms of a regular expression of labels or aggregates that are in M. We express this regular expression formally by the equivalent non-deterministic finite automaton (Q, M, δ, s 0 , F ) over the alphabet M, where Q is a set of states, q 0 is its initial state, F is the set of accepting states, and δ : Q × M → P(Q) is the state transition function.
e CONSTRAINTS section is a subset of C := (V → O ∪V) → B, i.e., each constraint is a boolean function, where the argument is itself a function that maps variable names in V to objects in O or values with primitive types in V.
A C SL rule is a tuple (T , E, A, C), where T is the reference type specified by the SPEC keyword, E ⊆ M is the set of forbidden events, A = (Q, M, δ, s 0 , F ) ∈ A is the automaton induced by the regular expression of the ORDER section, and C ⊆ C is the set of CONSTRAINTS that the rule lists.
Our formal definition of a C SL rule does not contain the sections REQUIRES, ENSURES, and NEGATES. ose sections reason about the interaction of predicates, which requires a different formal treatment that we discuss in Section 4.2.2.
Runtime Semantics
Each C SL rule encodes usage constraints to be validated for all runtime objects of the reference type T stated in its SPEC section. We define the semantics of a C SL rule in terms of an evaluation over a runtime program trace that records all relevant runtime objects and values, as well as all events specified within the rule.
An event is a tuple (m, e) ∈ E of a method signature m ∈ M and an environment e, i.e., a mapping V → O ∪V of the parameter variable names to concrete runtime objects and values. If the environment e holds a concrete object for the this value, then it is called the event's base object.
For any τ ∈ E * , a subsequence τ i 1 ...τ i n is called an object trace if i 1 < ... < i n and all base objects of τ i j are identical. Figure 1 result in an object trace that has two events:
Lines 1-2 in
where m 0 and m 1 are the signatures of the getInstance and init methods of the KeyGenerator class. For static factory methods such as getInstance, we assume this to bind to the returned object. o k denotes the object that at runtime is bound to the variable kG.
e decision whether a runtime trace τ satisfies a set of C SL rules involves two steps. In the first step, individual object traces are evaluated independently of one another. Yet, different runtime objects may still interact with each other. C SL rules capture this interaction by means of predicates that a rule ensures on a runtime object. ese interactions between different objects are checked in a second step against the specification by considering the predicates they require and ensure. We now discuss these steps in more detail. is definition of sat o ignores interactions with other object traces. We will discuss later how such interactions are resolved. In the following, we assume the trace
. We will also refer to our example from Figure 1 and the involved rules of KeyGenerator (Figure 4 ) and Cipher ( Figure 5 ) to illustrate the computation. e function sat o is composed of three sub-functions:
Forbidden Events (sat o F ). Given a trace τ o and a set of forbidden events E, sat o ensures that none of the trace events is forbidden.
e C SL rule for KeyGenerator does not list any forbidden methods. Hence, sat o trivially evaluates to true for object kG in Figure 1 .
Figure 7: e function sat o verifies an individual object trace for the object o. 
Order Errors (sat o A
). e second function checks that the trace object is used in compliance with the specified usage pa ern, i.e., all methods in the rule are invoked in no other than the specified order. Formally, the sequence of method signatures of the object trace m o := m o 0 , . . . ,m o n , i.e., the projection onto the method signatures, must be an element of the language L(A o ) that the automaton A o = (Q, M, δ, s 0 , F ) of the ORDER section induces. By definition of language containment, a er the last observed signature of the trace m o n , the corresponding state of the automaton must be an accepting state s ∈ F . is definition ignores any variable bindings.
ey are evaluated in the second step. Figure 8 displays the automaton created for KeyGenerator using the aggregate names as labels. State -1 is the initial state, and state 2 is the only accepting state. Following the code in Figure 1 for the object kG of type KeyGenerator, the automaton transitions from state -1 to 0 at the call to getInstance (Line 1). With the calls to init (Line 2) and generateKey (Line 3), the automaton first moves to state 1 and finally to state 2. erefore, function sat o A evaluates to true for this example.
Constraints (sat o C
). e validity check of the constraints ensures that all constraints of C are satisfied.
is check requires the sequence of environments (e o 0 , ..., e o n ) of the trace τ o . All objects that are bound to the variables along the trace must satisfy the constraints of the rule.
To compute sat o C for the KeyGenerator object kG at the call to getInstance in Line 1, only the first constraint has to be checked.
is is because the corresponding environment e o 1 holds a value only for algorithm, and the other two constraints reference other variable names. e evaluation function c returns true if algorithm assumes either "AES" or "Blowfish" as its value, which is the case in Figure 1 . e computation of sat o C for Lines 2-3 works similarly.
Interaction of Object Traces.
To define interactions between individual object traces, the REQUIRES, ENSURES, and NEGATES sections allow individual C SL rules to reference one another. For a rule for one object to hold at any given point in an execution trace, all predicates that its REQUIRES section lists must have been both previously ensured (by other specifications) and not negated. Predicates are ensured (i.e., generated) and negated (i.e., killed) by certain events. Formally, a predicate is an element of P := {(name, args) | args ∈ V * }, i.e., a pair of a predicate name and a sequence of variable names. Predicates are generated in specific states. Each C SL rule induces a function G : S → P(P) that maps each state of its automaton to the predicate(s) that the state generates.
e predicates listed in the ENSURES and NEGATES sections may be followed by the term after n, where n is a method event pattern label or an aggregate. e states that follow the event or aggregate n in the automaton generate the respective predicate. If the term after is not used for a predicate, the final states of the automaton generate (or negate) that predicate, i.e., we implicitly interpret it as after n, where n is an event that leads to a final state.
In addition to states that are selected as predicate-generating, the predicate is also ensured if the object resides in any state that transitively follows the selected state, unless the states are explicitly (de-)selected for the same predicate within the NEGATES section.
At any state that generates a predicate, the event driving the automaton into this state binds the variable names to the values that the specification previously collected along its object trace.
Formally, an event n o = (m o , e o ) ∈ E of a rule r and for an object o ensures a predicate p = (predName, args) ∈ P on the objects e o ∈ O if: (1) e method m o of the event leads to a state s of the automaton that generates the predicate p, i.e. p ∈ G(s). For the KeyGeneraor object kG in Figure 1 , a predicate is generated at Line 7 because (1) its automaton transitions to its only predicate-generating state, state 2, (2) sat o evaluates to true as previously shown for each subfunction and (3) the corresponding C SL rule does not require any predicates.
DETECTING MISUSES OF CRYPTO APIS
To detect all possible rule violations, our tool C C approximates the evaluation function sat o using a static data-flow analysis. In a security context, it is a requirement to detect as many misuses as possible. A drawback of this decision is the potential for false warnings that originate from over-approximations that the static analysis requires. In the following, we use the example in Figure 9 to illustrate why and where approximations are required. We will show later in our evaluation that, in practice, our analysis is highly precise and that the chosen approximations rarely lead to false warnings. e code example in Figure 9 implements a hashing operation. By default, the code uses SHA-256 for the operation. However, if the condition option1 evaluates to true, MD5 is chosen instead (Line 88). e C SL rule for MessageDigest, displayed in Figure 10 , does not allow the usage of MD5 though, because MD5 is no longer secure [14] . e update operation is performed only on non-empty input (Line 91). Otherwise, the call to update is skipped and only the call to digest is executed, without any input. Although not strictly insecure, this usage does not comply with the C SL rule for MessageDigest, because it leads to no content being hashed.
To approximate sat o F , the analysis must search for possible forbidden events by first constructing a call graph for the whole program under analysis. It then iterates through the graph edges to find calls to forbidden methods. Depending on the precision of the call graph, the analysis may find calls to forbidden methods that cannot be reached at runtime. e analysis represents each runtime object o by its allocation site. In our example, allocation sites are new expressions and getInstance calls that return an object of a type for which a C SL rule exists. For each such allocation site, the analysis approximates sat o A by first creating a state-machine. C C then evaluates the state machine using a typestate analysis that abstracts runtime traces by program paths. e typestate analysis is path-insensitive, thus, at branch points, it assumes that both sides of the branch may execute. In our example, this feature leads to a false positive: although the condition in Line 91 always evaluates to true, and the call to update is never actually skipped, the analysis considers that this may happen, and thus reports a rule violation.
To approximate sat o C , we have extended the typestate analysis to also collect potential runtime values of variables along all program paths where an allocated object is used. e constraint solver first filters out all irrelevant constraints. A constraint is irrelevant if it refers to one or more variables that the typestate analysis has not encountered. In Figure 10 , the rule only includes one internal constraint-on variable algorithm. If we add a new internal constraint to the rule about the variable offset, the constraint solver will filter it out as irrelevant when analyzing the code in Figure 9 , because the only method that this variable is associated with (digest labeled d3) is never called. e analysis distinguishes between never encountering a variable in the source code and not being able to extract the values of a variable. Using the same rule and code snippet, if the analysis fails to extract the value for algorithm, the constraint evaluates to false. Collecting potential values of a variable over all possible program paths of an allocation site may lead to further imprecision. In our example, the analysis cannot statically rule out that algorithm may be MD5.
e rule forbids the usage of MD5. erefore, the analysis reports a misuse.
Handling predicates in our analysis follows the formal description very closely. If sat o evaluates to true for a given allocation site, the analysis checks whether all required predicates for the allocation site have been ensured earlier in the program. In the trivial case, when no predicate is required, the analysis immediately ensures the predicate defined in the ENSURES section.
e analysis constantly maintains a list of all ensured predicates, including the statements in the program that a given predicate can be ensured for. If the allocation site under analysis requires predicates from other allocation sites, the analysis consults the list of ensured predicates and checks whether the required predicate, with matching names and arguments, exists at the given statement. If the analysis finds all required predicates, it ensures the predicate(s) specified in the ENSURES section of the rule.
IMPLEMENTATION
We have implemented C C using Xtext [16] , an opensource framework for developing domain-specific languages. Given the C SL grammar, Xtext provides a parser, type checker, and syntax highlighter for the language. When supplied with a typesafe C SL rule, Xtext outputs the corresponding AST, which C C then uses to generate the required static analysis. For the static analysis, we use the program analysis framework Soot [30] . Soot transforms a given Java program into an intermediate representation that facilitates executing intra-and inter-procedural static analyses. e framework provides standard static analyses such as call graph construction. Additionally, Soot can analyze a given Android app intra-procedurally. Further extensions by FlowDroid [5] enable the construction of Android-specific call graphs that are necessary to perform inter-procedural analysis.
Validating the ORDER section requires solving the typestate check sat o A . To achieve this, we use IDE al , a framework for efficient interprocedural data-flow analysis [28] , to instantiate a typestate analysis.
e analysis defines the finite state machine A o to check against and the allocation sites to start the analysis from. From those allocation sites, IDE al performs a flow-, field-, and contextsensitive data-flow analysis.
e constraints and the predicates require knowledge about objects and values associated with rule variables at given execution points in the program. e typestate analysis in C C extracts the primitive values and objects on-the-fly, where the latter are abstracted by allocation sites. When the typestate analysis encounters a call site that is referred to in an event definition, and the respective rule requires the object or value of an argument to the call, C C triggers an on-the-fly backward analysis to extract the objects or values that may participate in the call. is on-the-fly analysis yields comparatively high performance and scalability, because many of the arguments of interest are values of type String and Integer. us, using an on-demand computation avoids constant propagation of all strings and integers through the program. For the on-the-fly backward analysis, we extended the on-demand pointer analysis Boomerang [29] to propagate both allocation sites and primitive values.
Once the typestate analysis is completed, and all required queries to Boomerang are computed, C C solves the internal constraints and predicates using our own custom-made solvers.
EVALUATION
We evaluate our implementation of C SL and C C by addressing the following research questions: To answer these questions, we developed C SL rules for all JCA classes. We then applied C C using this ruleset to statically analyze 10,001 Android apps from the AndroZoo dataset [3] . We chose apps that are available in the official Google Play Store and received an update in 2017. is ensures that we report on the most up-to-date usages of Crypto APIs. Our project web page lists all apps in our dataset and our C SL ruleset to facilitate reproduction: h p://cryptoapis.wordpress.com During our evaluation, C C frequently reported misuses within packages for commonly used libraries across different apps. To avoid over-counting the same misuses, we excluded the following common library packages: com.google, com.unity3d, com.facebook.ads, and com.android. 
Precision and Recall (RQ1)
Setup. To compute precision and recall, two authors of this work manually checked 50 randomly selected apps from our dataset for typestate errors and violations of internal constraints. We did not check for unsatisfied predicates or forbidden events because these are hard to detect manually. We compare the results of our manual analysis to those reported by C C . Our goal here is to compute precision and recall of the analysis implementation in C C , not the quality of our C SL rules. We discuss the la er in Section 7.4. Consequently, we define a false positive to be a warning that should not be reported according to the specified rule, irrespective of that rule's semantic correctness (similarly for false negatives).
Results. In the 50 apps we inspected, C C detects 228 usages of JCA classes. Table 1 lists the misuses it finds. Overall, the analysis finds 156 misuses. In particular, it issues 27 typestaterelated warnings, with only 2 false positives, because the analysis is path insensitive (Section 5). We further found 4 false negatives, which are caused by initializing a MessageDigest or a MAC object without completing the operation. C C fails to find these typestate errors, because the supporting alias analysis times out, and C C aborts the typestate analysis without reporting a warning.
e automated analysis finds 129 violations of internal constraints. We were able to confirm 110 of them. For the other 19 cases, the analysis fails to statically extract possible runtime values for certain variables due to obfuscated code. For such values, the constraint solver reports the corresponding constraint as violated. We have also checked the apps for missed constraint violations, but were not able to locate any.
RQ1: Our manual analysis shows that our typestate analysis achieves high precision (92.6%) and recall (86.2%). e constraint resolution has a precision of 85.3% and a recall of 100%.
Types of Misuses (RQ2)
Setup. We report the results of analyzing all 10,001 Android apps from AndroZoo. We then use the results of our manual analysis (Section 7.1) as a baseline to evaluate our findings on a large scale.
Results. C C detects the usage of at least one JCA class in 4,071 apps (41% of the analyzed apps). Most of these apps (96%) contain at least one misuse. In total, C C discovers 19,756 individual object traces that contradict the specified rule pa erns. We categorize these misuses into the following: typestate errors (2,669), unsatisfied predicates (3523), forbidden events (159), and internal constraint violations (11, 436 ). e violations of internal constraints represent the largest class of misuses. Approximately 82% of these violations are related to MessageDigest. In our manual analysis, most violations (89/110) originate from usages of MD5 and SHA-1. Many developers still use these algorithms, although both are no longer recommended by security experts [14] . C C identifies 1,766 (15.4%) constraint violations related to Cipher usages. Our manual analysis confirms that all misuses of the Cipher class are due to using the insecure algorithm DES or mode of operation ECB. is result is in line with the findings of prior studies [11, 12, 27] .
More than 75% of the typestate errors are caused by misuses of MessageDigest.
rough our manual analysis, we a ribute this high number to incorrect usages of reset. In addition to misusing MessageDigest, misuses of Cipher contribute 421 typestate errors. Finally, C C detects 89 typestate errors related to PBEKeySpec.
e ORDER section of the C SL rule for PBEKeySpec requires calling clearPassword at the end of the lifetime of a PBEKeySpec object. We manually inspected 3 of the reported misuses and observed that the invocation of clearPassword is missing in all of them.
Predicates are unsatisfied when C C expects the interaction of multiple object traces but is not able to prove their correct interaction. With 3,523 unsatisfied predicates reported, the number may seem relatively large because unsatisfied predicates accumulate transitively. For example, if C C cannot ensure a predicate for a usage of IVParameterSpec, it will not generate a predicate for the key object that KeyGenerator generates using the IVParameterSpec object. Transitively, C C reports an unsatisfied predicate for a Cipher object that relies on the generated key object. C C also finds 159 calls to forbidden methods. As only two JCA classes require the definition of forbidden methods in our C SL ruleset (PBEKeySpec and Cipher), we do not find this low number surprising. A manual analysis of a handful of reports suggests that most of the reported forbidden methods originate from the insecure PBEKeySpec constructors (Section 3).
From the 4,071 apps that use at least one JCA Crypto API, 1,757 contain at least one typestate error (43%), 1,079 lack required predicates (26.5%), 155 use at least one forbidden method (3.8%), and 4,001 violate at least one internal constraint (93.7%). Ignoring the class MessageDigest, 1,119 apps still violate at least one constraint in other classes.
RQ2: 96% of apps misuse at least one Crypto API. Violating the constraints of MessageDigest is the most common type of misuse.
Performance (RQ3)
Setup. C C comprises four main phases. It constructs (1) a call graph using FlowDroid [5] and then runs the actual analysis (Section 5), which (2) calls the typestate analysis and (3) constraint analysis as required, a empting to (4) resolve all declared predicates. During the analysis of our dataset, we measured the execution time that C C spent in each phase. We ran C C once per application and capped the time of each run to 30 minutes. Results. Overall, C C times out a er 30 minutes for only 275 of all 10,001 apps in our dataset (2.75%). Unfortunately, C C crashed during the analysis of 604 apps in different phases. Figure 11 summarizes the distribution of analysis times (in seconds) for the four phases as well as the total analysis time.
e numbers are reported across the remaining 9,122 apps for which the analysis successfully terminates in the allo ed 30 minutes. For each phase, the box plot highlights the median, the 25% and 75% quartiles, and the minimal and maximal values of the distribution.
Across the apps in our dataset, there is a very large variation in the reported execution time (between 10 seconds and 29.9 minutes). We a ribute this to two main reasons. First, apps have different sizes-reachable methods in the call graph vary between 141 and 30,259 (median: 3,075 methods). e majority of the total analysis time is spent on call-graph construction. Resolving all declared predicates takes approximately 0.6 seconds for half of the apps, with the typestate analysis having a median runtime of 3.2 seconds. For more than half of the apps, the value extraction and constraint resolution finishes in less than 1 second.
RQ3:
On average, C C analyzes an app in 108 seconds, with call-graph construction taking most of the time (76%).
Comparison to Existing Tools (RQ4)
Setup. We compare C C to C L [12] , the most closely related tool. Unfortunately, we were unable to obtain access to C L 's implementation, despite contacting the authors. However, we were able to use C SL to reimplement the original ruleset of C L . C SL has generally proven expressive enough to model the C L rules, proving it is a useful specification language beyond the scope of this work.
Our original C SL ruleset covers all JCA classes. C L , however, comprises only six individual rules. For easier distinction, we refer to our full ruleset for all JCA classes as R , the original rules C L uses as R , and our C SL version for them as R C SL . Both R and R C SL are available at our project website. R does not include any typestate properties or forbidden methods, and hence, can be modelled using only internal constraints and predicates in C SL. For three out of the six rules in R , C SL expresses exactly the checks that C L performs. e remaining three rules (3,4, and 6 in [12] ) cannot be directly expressed. C L rule 4, for instance, requires non-constant values for salts in PBEKeySpec. In C SL such a relationship is expressed through predicates. However, predicates model correct behaviour only. erefore, in C SL we had to further strengthen this C L rule: we created a rule for PBEKeySpec that requires the salt to be random. We followed a similar approach with the other two rules in R . Despite being more strict than R , R C SL ensures a fair comparison between C C and C L : when comparing the two tools in terms of their findings, the stricter rules in R C SL tend to produce more warnings than R , which works in favor of C L .
Results. Using R C SL , C C detects usages of JCA classes in 1,726 Android apps. In total, it reports 6,098 misuses, only a third of roughly 20,000 misuses that C C identifies using the R . For each of the four types of misuses, C C finds more apps using R . Using R C SL , all reported warnings are related to 6 classes, compared to 14 using R . e differences mainly stem from three types of misuses. As we have pointed out, R C SL does not specify any typestate properties or forbidden methods. Hence, it does not find approximately 3,000 warnings that C C identifies in these categories using R . Furthermore, while C C reports 11,436 constraint violations using R , it reports only 1,356 using R C SL . To our surprise, significantly fewer apps violate four of the six original rules in R . For example, for C L rule 1 that forbids the use of ECB mode for encryption, C L identified 7,656 apps breaking this rule (65.2% of apps that use Crypto APIs). Using R C SL , C C identifies 658 usages of ECB mode in 38.1% of apps that use Crypto APIs. Although a high number of apps still exhibit this basic misuse, there is a considerable decrease compared to previous studies.
RQ4: e more comprehensive C C ruleset detects 3× as many misuses as C L in twice as many JCA classes.
reats to Validity
Our ruleset is mainly based on the documentation of the JCA [24] . Although the authors of this paper have significant domain expertise, our C SL-rule specifications for the JCA are only as correct as the JCA documentation. Our static analysis toolchain depends on multiple external components. Yet, of course, we cannot fully rule out bugs in the implementation. Java allows a developer to programmatically select a non-default cryptographic service provider. C C currently does not detect such customizations but instead assumes that the default provider is used. is behaviour may lead to imprecise results, because our rules forbid certain default values that are insecure for the default provider but may be secure for a different one.
RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss languages that specify API properties and tools that detect misuses of security APIs.
Specifying API Properties. ere is a significant body of research on textual specification languages that ensure API properties by means of static data-flow analysis. For example, tracematches [2] enable runtime-checking typestate properties defined by regular expressions over runtime objects. Bodden et at. [8, 10] as well as Naeem and Lhoták [23] present algorithms to (partially) evaluate state matches prior to the program execution, using static analysis.
Martin et al. [19] present Program ery Language (PQL) that enables a developer to specify pa erns of event sequences that constitute potentially defective behaviour. A combination of static and dynamic analyses match the pa erns to a given program. A pattern may include a fix that is applied to each match by dynamic instrumentation. PQL has been applied to detecting security-related vulnerabilities such as memory leaks [19] , SQL injection and crosssite scripting [18] . Compared to tracematches, PQL captures a greater variety of pa ern specifications, at the disadvantage of using a flow-insensitive static analysis. PQL serves as the main inspiration for the C SL syntax. Other languages that pursue similar goals include PTQL [15] , PDL [21] , and TS4J [9] .
ese languages and their analysis-tool support are different from C SL and C C in three main aspects. First, these systems follow a black-list approach by defining and finding incorrect program behaviour. On the other hand, C SL rules define desired behaviour, which in the case of Crypto APIs leads to more compact specifications. Second, the above languages are general-purpose languages for bug finding, while C SL specifically targets misuses of Crypto APIs, which may seem a limitation of C SL. However, the stronger focus on cryptography allows us to cover a greater portion of cryptography-related problems in C SL compared to other languages, while at the same time keeping C SL relatively simple. ird, C C uses state-ofthe-art static analyses that have superior performance and precision compared to other static-analysis approaches [28] .
Detecting Misuses of Security APIs. roughout the paper, we have discussed C L [12] , and compared it to C C in Section 7. Another tool that finds misuses of Crypto APIs is Crypto Misuse Analyzer (CMA) [27] . e CMA ruleset has significant overlaps with our C SL ruleset. However, the CMA rules are limited to misuses related to encryption and hashing. Unlike C C , CMA has been evaluated on a small dataset of only 45 apps. Chatzikonstantinou et al. [11] ran a dynamic checker for a number of misuses and manually verified their findings on 49 apps. All three studies concluded that at least 88% of the studied apps misuse at least one Crypto API.
Unlike C C , none of these tools facilitates rule creation by means of a higher-level specification language. Instead, the rules are hard-coded into the tool, making it hard for nonexperts to extend or alter the ruleset. Due to its Java-like syntax, C SL enables regular developers-including cryptography expertsto define their own rules. C C then automatically transforms those rules into the appropriate static analysis checks. Finally, C C includes a typestate analysis that checks for generally forbidden methods.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present C SL, a description language for correct usages of cryptographic APIs. Each C SL rule is specific to one class, and it may include usage pa ern definitions and constraints on parameter values. Predicates model the interactions between classes. For example, a rule may generate a predicate on an object if it is used successfully, and another rule may require that predicate from an object that it uses. We also present C C , a static analyzer that checks a given program for its compliance with our C SL ruleset. Applying C C to 10,001 Android apps, we found 20,000 misuses spread over 96% of the 4,071 apps that use the JCA. C C terminates successfully in under 2 minutes for more than half of the apps.
In future work, we plan to address the following challenges. C SL currently only supports a binary understanding of securitya usage is either secure or not. We would like to enhance C SL to have a more fine-grained notion of security. is notion will allow for more nuanced warnings in C C . is is challenging, because the C SL language still ought to be concise. Also, C SL currently requires one rule per class per JCA provider, because there is no way to express the commonality and variability between different providers implementing the same algorithms.
is leads to specification overhead. To address this, we plan to modularize the language using import and override mechanisms. Moreover, we plan to consider extending C SL to support more complex properties such as using the same cryptographic key for multiple purposes. Finally, we plan to improve the performance of C C through incremental static analysis [4] .
